The High Court in Belfast has dismissed a judicial review challenge against the PSNI, ruling that neither a person released on police bail nor a custody officer has the power to move forward a bail surrender date to an earlier time than that originally appointed.

The case was brought by Martin Fegan, who was arrested on 16 July 2024 in connection with a series of cross-border fraud offences targeting the agri-business sector. He was interviewed at a PSNI station and released on bail with a requirement to return on 15 January 2025. Following further exchanges, he was bailed again on 27 February 2025 from Banbridge PSNI station, with a return date of 23 May 2025 at 14:00.

On 30 April 2025, Fegan's solicitor contacted the investigating officer, D/Constable Costello, stating that both he and Fegan were unable to attend on 23 May and requesting an earlier date of 15 May. The PSNI declined, citing the Court of Appeal's April 2025 ruling in Re Higgins [2025] NICA 19, which had declared unlawful two practices involving the informal extension of police bail surrender dates. Fegan's solicitor subsequently argued that a pre-booked holiday constituted an unavoidable cause under Article 48(8) of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (PACE), entitling the applicant to have the bail date extended. The PSNI rejected that argument.

Fegan then issued judicial review proceedings, including a request for interim relief. On 20 May 2025, McAlinden J refused leave, describing the case as neither arguable nor having reasonable prospects of success. The Court of Appeal subsequently granted interim relief allowing Fegan to travel on holiday, on condition that he surrender to Banbridge police station by 6 June 2025. The Court of Appeal later allowed the appeal against the refusal of leave and remitted the case to the High Court, noting that a point of legal certainty remained to be resolved.

McLaughlin J, delivering judgment on 26 May 2026, rejected the applicant's central argument that Article 35(8)(b) of PACE conferred a statutory right to return to custody at a time and date of his own choosing, earlier than that appointed. The judge found that Article 35(8)(b) was a purely explanatory provision, clarifying the legal status of a person upon returning to a police station in answer to bail, and contained nothing to support a right of earlier surrender. The judge also rejected the argument that the phrases "answer to bail" and "surrender to custody" carried different legal meanings within the statutory scheme.

On the question of whether a custody officer could use the power of appointment under Article 48(1)(b) of PACE to substitute an earlier surrender date, the judge acknowledged plausible arguments on both sides but concluded that he was bound by the Court of Appeal's reasoning in Re Higgins. That reasoning placed significant emphasis on the physical presence of a suspect in custody at the time a bail appointment is made, and appeared to preclude any "re-appointment" of surrender dates under Article 48(1)(b). The judge noted that if such an interpretation was available, it was a matter for a higher court to confirm.

On the second ground of challenge, the judge found that a pre-booked holiday did not amount to an inability to attend within the meaning of Article 48(8) of PACE. The judge held that the provision required genuine inability to attend, not mere inconvenience or a conflicting commitment, and that the PSNI had been entitled to refuse the extension request on that basis. The application for judicial review was dismissed.